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The Benefits of Branching 
Deregulation
Jith Jayaratne and Philip E. Strahan*
he Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act, implemented in
June 1997, enables banks to establish branches
and buy other banks across the country. This
legislation is the final stage of a quarter-century-long effort
to relax geographic limits on banks. As recently as 1975, no
state allowed out-of-state bank holding companies (BHCs) to
buy in-state banks, and only fourteen states permitted
statewide branching. By 1990, all states but Hawaii
allowed out-of-state BHCs to buy in-state banks, and all
but three states allowed statewide branching. The Riegle-
Neal Act removes the remaining restrictions by permitting
banks and BHCs to cross state lines freely.1
Although the effects of the recent federal legislation
will be known only over time, we can study the impact of
geographic restrictions on the banking industry by
examining an earlier stage of the deregulatory process.
The states were most active in removing geographic limits
on banks in the fifteen years from 1978 to 1992. By
observing the changes in banking that followed the state
initiatives, we can learn much about the impact of these
limits.2 Previous research has suggested that geographic
restrictions destabilized the banking system by creating
small, poorly diversified banks that were vulnerable to
bank runs and portfolio shocks (Calomiris 1993). In this
article, we focus instead on the effect of the restrictions on
the efficiency of the banking system.
We find that bank efficiency improved greatly
once branching restrictions were lifted. Loan losses and
operating costs fell sharply, and the reduction in banks’
costs was largely passed along to bank borrowers in the form
of lower loan rates. The relaxation of state limits on inter-
state banking was also followed by improvements in bank
performance, but the gains were smaller and the evidence
of a causal relationship less robust. 
Our analysis suggests that much of the efficiency
improvement brought about by branching was attributable
T
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to a selection process whereby better performing banks
expanded at the expense of poorer performers. It appears that
the branching restrictions acted as a ceiling on the size of
well-managed banks, preventing their expansion and
retarding a process of industry evolution in which less efficient
firms routinely lose ground to more efficient ones.
While the improvements to the banking system
following deregulation helped bank customers directly, we
also find important benefits to the rest of the economy. In par-
ticular, state economies grew significantly faster once branch-
ing was allowed—in part, we suggest, because deregulation
permitted the expansion of those banks that were best able to
route savings to the most productive uses. Although it is
uncertain whether the observed acceleration in economic
growth will last beyond ten years, the stimulative effect of
branching deregulation on the economy has been considerable.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF GEOGRAPHIC 
RESTRICTIONS ON BANKING
States began imposing limits on branch office locations in
the nineteenth century. Such limits were intended in part
to prevent unscrupulous bankers from “choosing inaccessible
office sites to deter customers from redeeming . . . circulating
banknotes” (Kane 1996, p. 142). Geographic limits were
also justified by the political argument that allowing banks
to expand their operations freely could lead to an excessive
concentration of financial power. Appearing before Congress
in 1939, the Secretary of the Independent Bankers Association
warned that branch banking would “destroy a banking
system that is distinctively American and replace it
with a foreign system . . . a system that is monopolistic,
undemocratic and with tinges of fascism” (Chapman and
Westerfield 1942, p. 238). 
Inefficient banks probably supported these restric-
tions because they prevented competition from other
banks. Economides, Hubbard, and Palia (1995) show that
states with many weakly capitalized small banks favored
the 1927 McFadden Act, which gave states the authority to
regulate national banks’ branching powers. The states
themselves often benefited from exercising control over the
supply of bank charters and the expansion of branch bank-
ing. Massachusetts and Delaware, for instance, received a
majority of their state revenues from bank regulation in the
early nineteenth century (Sylla, Legler, and Wallis 1987).
Geographic restrictions may not have seriously
constrained the banking industry before the appearance
of large corporations that required large-scale, multi-
state banking services. Rapid industrialization and the
growth of transcontinental railroads after the Civil War,
however, created firms whose need for comprehensive
corporate financial services could not be met adequately
by the existing system of fragmented unit banks. In
response, banks formed “chain banks”—an alliance of
several banks whose principal ownership rested with the
same group of investors—after 1890. A few years later,
“banking groups”—banks owned directly by a holding
company—were created in an effort to get around
branching restrictions (Calomiris 1993).
Nevertheless, branching restrictions persisted, and
as late as 1975 only fourteen states allowed statewide
branching. Twelve states prohibited branching altogether,
and the remainder imposed restrictions of varying severity.
Pennsylvania was representative of a partially restrictive
state. Until 1982, Pennsylvania banks were allowed to
branch only in the county where their head offices were
located and in contiguous counties.
In addition to facing restrictions on in-state
branching, banks have traditionally been limited in
their ability to cross state lines. The Douglas Amend-
ment to the 1956 Bank Holding Company Act prohibited
a BHC from acquiring banks outside the state where it
was headquartered unless the target bank’s state per-
mitted such acquisitions. Since no state allowed such
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transactions in 1956, the amendment effectively barred
interstate banking organizations. Although states had
the option to allow out-of-state BHCs to enter, none
exercised that right until 1978, when Maine permitted
such transactions. Even then, however, little changed:
the Maine statute allowed an out-of-state BHC to buy a
Maine bank only if the home state of the acquiring BHC
permitted Maine-based BHCs the reciprocal right to
buy banks there; since no other state allowed such entry,
interstate bank organizations could not be formed.
Banks could not in fact cross state borders until 1982,
when Alaska, Massachusetts, and New York permitted
out-of-state BHCs to enter.
MOVES TOWARD DEREGULATION
Maine’s 1978 move to permit entry by out-of-state BHCs
marked the beginning of a fifteen-year period in which the
states relaxed barriers to bank expansion.3 By the end of
1992, the state-level deregulatory process was essentially
completed: all states but Arkansas, Iowa, and Minnesota
allowed statewide branching, and all states but Hawaii per-
mitted out-of-state BHCs to enter. 
Table 1 chronicles the steps taken by individual
states to eliminate geographic restrictions.4 The first column
presents the year in which each state authorized branching
by means of merger and acquisition.5 The second column
reports the year in which each state first permitted interstate
banking. In some cases, choosing a date for the authorization
of branching was difficult, because the states often deregu-
lated only gradually. In most cases, the date selected reflects
the time at which the state finished the branching
deregulation process.6 In four cases, however, we chose dates
earlier than the literal end of the process of deregulation
because the remaining restrictions did not appear to impose
a meaningful constraint on branching.7
FORCES OF CHANGE
Several developments contributed to the removal of the geo-
graphic barriers to bank expansion. In the mid-1980s, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency took advantage of a
clause in the 1864 National Bank Act to allow nationally
chartered banks to branch freely in those states where thrifts
did not face branching restrictions. The Comptroller’s action
was instrumental in introducing statewide branching in
Table 1








Alaska Before 1970 1982
Arizona Before 1970 1986
Arkansas 1994 1989
California Before 1970 1987
Colorado 1991 1988
Connecticut 1980 1983
Delaware Before 1970 1988




















Nevada Before 1970 1985
New Hampshire 1987 1987
New Jersey 1977 1986
New Mexico 1991 1989
New York 1976 1982
North Carolina Before 1970 1985





Rhode Island Before 1970 1984
South Carolina Before 1970 1986







West Virginia 1987 1988
Wisconsin 1990 1987
Wyoming 1988 1987
Source: Chronology is based on information in Amel (1993).
Note:  Before the passage of the Riegle-Neal Act, Iowa had not deregulated
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several southern states. Another impetus behind deregulation
may have been the rash of bank and thrift failures in the
1980s, which increased public awareness of the advantages of
large, well-diversified banks (Kane 1996). 
Kroszner and Strahan (1997) suggest that the emer-
gence of new technologies in both deposit taking and lending
encouraged the elimination of geographic barriers by chang-
ing the nature of banking markets. For instance, the introduc-
tion of the automated teller machine in the late 1970s and the
development of money market mutual funds increased com-
petitiveness in deposit markets.  As a result, branching and
interstate banking restrictions could no longer offer the same
degree of protection from competition, making it less likely
that banks would lobby for the preservation of these rules. At
the same time, new information technologies diminished the
value of the specialized knowledge that long-established local
bankers might have had about the risks of borrowers in the
community. This change enhanced the ability of banks to lend
in more distant markets. Thus, a situation developed in which
protected banks’ incentive to defend restrictions on branching
and interstate banking diminished over time, while expan-
sion-minded banks’ desire to see the restrictions fall increased.
The initiative to relax restrictions on interstate
banking came primarily from larger banking organizations
that were well equipped to pursue lower funding costs
and better lending opportunities in neighboring states.
Their efforts may have succeeded in the 1980s because it
became apparent that banks and nonbanks were already prac-
ticing interstate banking. As Savage (1993) argues, “the pro-
liferation of loan production offices, nonbank subsidiaries of
bank holding companies, nonbank banks, and interstate
thrift institutions, the widespread use of credit cards, and
the provision of financial services by nonfinancial firms not
subject to geographic limitations all made the tradi-
tional restrictions on the geographic expansion of banks
more difficult to explain and justify. If so many financial
services could be provided across state lines by these various
means, why shouldn’t deposit-taking institutions be allowed
to expand as well?” 
The breakdown of the geographic constraints on
banks over the last twenty years has had a significant
impact on the industry. Branching deregulation has
prompted banks to enter new markets (Amel and Liang
1992), persuaded BHCs to consolidate their subsidiaries
into branches (McLaughlin 1995), and forced smaller
institutions to exit banking (Calem 1994). Interstate
banking activity has increased dramatically, boosting the
percentage of deposits held by out-of-state BHCs in the
typical state from 2 percent to 28 percent between 1979
and 1994 (Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise 1995). Interstate
banking has also intensified the demands placed on bank
management: the compensation of managers is now tied
more closely to bank performance, and the turnover rate
among banks’ chief executive officers has increased
(Hubbard and Palia 1995). 
In addition to prompting changes in the organiza-
tion of the industry and the behavior of individual banks,
deregulation has had profound effects on the overall perfor-
mance of the banking system. The next section looks at the
impact of deregulation on two components of bank perfor-
mance: the costs of providing services and the prices
charged customers for those services. 
DEREGULATION, COST EFFICIENCY,
AND PRICES
Did banks perform better when they were permitted to
operate statewide branch networks and to build multi-
state bank holding companies? We investigate this question
by examining whether bank costs—as measured by loan
losses (net loan charge-offs divided by total loans) and non-
interest costs (noninterest expenses divided by total
assets)—declined after deregulation, creating a more effi-
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cient system. We also examine changes in loan prices
(interest income on loans and leases divided by total loans
and leases) to determine whether bank customers are better
off following deregulation. We look at state-level data for the
1978-92 period to summarize the impact of deregulation on
the overall performance of the banking system.
To understand how we arrive at our measures
of the cost efficiency of the banking system, consider
New York in 1978. We construct the charge-offs ratio
by dividing the sum of loans charged off by all banks
operating in New York in 1978 by the sum of all loans
held by New York banks in 1978. We construct simi-
lar aggregates for the noninterest expense and loan
price variables in each state and year in the sample.8
The data for these performance measures are derived
from the year-end Reports of Condition and Income,
filed by all banks with the federal banking agencies. 
We use regression techniques to estimate the
impact of deregulation on bank costs and loan prices. (For a
detailed discussion of these calculations, see Box 1.) The
regression methods allow us to control for other factors
that might influence our measures of bank cost and loan
prices—most notably, the health of the state’s economy.
Bank costs, particularly those related to loan defaults,
generally move with the business cycle: borrowers tend to
pay off loans during boom times but are less able to do so
during recessions. If states deregulated branching and
interstate banking during hard times, average measures of
costs could improve after deregulation as states’ economies
recovered from recession. A simple before-and-after com-
parison of bank performance would show an improvement
in bank loan portfolios and profitability after deregula-
tion, but these advances would largely reflect the timing
of deregulation. We address this possibility by controlling
Using the dates of deregulation reported in Table 1, we con-
struct two indicator variables equal to 1 for states permitting
branching and interstate banking. We then use these indica-
tor variables to estimate the effects of the policy changes in
the following regression model:
where yt,i equals one of our two cost measures or our measure
of loan prices in the ith state in year t, brancht,i is an indicator
equal to 1 for states without restrictions on branching, and
bankt,i is an indicator equal to 1 for states that have entered
into an interstate banking agreement.
In this specification, bi measures the state-specific
component of banking performance, at measures the effects of
the national business cycle at time t, and g1 and g2 measure the
changes in performance stemming from the two types of deregu-
lation. In constructing the deregulation indicators, we drop the
year in which the deregulation went into effect. We also drop
Delaware and South Dakota from the analysis entirely. These two
states experienced a dramatic expansion in their banking sectors
during the 1980s when credit card operations relocated there to
take advantage of liberal usury laws. As a result, performance
yti , at bi g1branchti , g2bankti , eti , ++ + + = ,
measures for banks in these two states do not reflect their branch-
ing laws, but rather the health and profitability of the credit card
business.
We then use the regression model to construct average
predicted values for our two cost measures and our measure of
loan prices in different regulatory environments. Consider
charge-offs. We estimate the predicted value of this variable
for each state and year for each of three regulatory configura-
tions: one in which both branching and interstate banking are
fully regulated (brancht,i = 0 and bankt,i = 0), one in which
branching is permitted but interstate banking is not
(brancht,i = 1 and bankt,i = 0), and one in which both branching
and interstate banking are permitted (brancht,i = 1 and bankt,i = 1).
This gives us a panel of predicted values for each state and
year in each of the three regulatory environments. We
then compute the simple average predicted charge-off ratio
(across states and years) for each regulatory configuration
and report each of those three averages in Chart 1 in the text.
The statistical significance reported in the text is derived
by testing the hypothesis that g1 and g2 estimated from the
above regression equal zero. 
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Source:  Authors’ calculations, based on data from Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council, Reports of Condition and Income.
Note:  Chart shows the average level of price and performance measures that
would have been observed in the 1978-92 period had all states been subject
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Ratio of Noninterest Expenses to Assets
Yield on Loans
for the national business cycle in our regressions.9
Our analysis suggests that loan losses, noninterest
expenses, and loan rates decreased significantly once statewide
branching was allowed—even after we adjust for the influence
of the business cycle on bank performance and for persistent
cross-state differences in bank performance.10 Chart 1 reports
the average levels of the cost and price measures that would
have been observed during the 1978-92 sample period under
three alternative regulatory regimes: (1) restrictions in place
on both branching and interstate banking, (2) branching
permitted but interstate banking prohibited, and (3) both
branching and interstate banking permitted. The top panel
suggests that if no state had allowed either statewide branch-
ing or interstate banking between 1978 and 1992, the ratio of
charge-offs to total loans in the typical state in a typical year
would have been 1.2 percent. Had all states allowed statewide
branching but prohibited interstate banking in our sample
period, average charge-offs in the typical state would have
fallen by half, to 0.6 percent.11 The ratio of noninterest
expenses to assets would have fallen from 3.5 percent to
3.3 percent if branching had been permitted throughout the
period (middle panel). It appears that most of these reduced
costs were passed along to bank borrowers in the form of lower
loan rates, which in our estimates declined from 11.5 percent
to 11.1 percent on average (bottom panel).12 Each of these
improvements is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.13
Foes of bank deregulation and consolidation have
argued that the increasing concentration in the banking
industry could enhance market power. While measures of
concentration at both the state and national levels have
increased in recent years following deregulation, concentra-
tion at local levels has remained remarkably constant
(Rhoades 1996). If enhanced market power were a problem,
we would see both increased concentration and higher
prices at the local level following deregulation, neither of
which has occurred. It is true that our estimates indicate that
bank costs have fallen more than revenues, suggesting an
increase in industry profitability. Similarly, estimates of the
impact of deregulation on banks’ return on equity and
return on assets in another study (Jayaratne and Strahan
forthcoming) showed small increases in profitability that
were sometimes statistically significant (at the 10 percent
level) and sometimes not. Nevertheless, it appears that
most, or perhaps all, of the cost reductions from deregula-
tion are passed along to customers. There is little evidence
that deregulation has increased market power.
Our regression analysis also shows that some mod-
est improvements in bank performance have followed the
introduction of interstate banking. Although operating
costs do not decline at all (Chart 1, middle panel), charge-
offs fall from 0.6 to 0.4 percent of total loans when
interstate banking is allowed in addition to statewideFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / DECEMBER 1997 19
Loan Charge-offs Fall after Branching Deregulation
in All but Two States
Chart 2
Source:  Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council, Reports of  Condition and Income.
Year of branching deregulation
































Change in loan charge-offs
branching (top panel), and the average interest rate falls
from 11.1 percent to 10.8 percent (bottom panel). 
The evidence of gains following interstate banking
deregulation, however, is much less robust than the evidence
of improvements following branching deregulation. When
we control for state business cycles (by including lags of
state-level personal income growth) as well as national
business cycles, we see no statistically significant improve-
ments following interstate banking. This finding suggests
that the observed gains might stem from favorable banking
conditions at the time of deregulation rather than from
deregulation itself. Alternatively, robust evidence of perfor-
mance improvements following interstate banking may be
lacking because most states entered interstate banking agree-
ments around the same time, making it difficult to distinguish
the effects of deregulation from the effects of other changes.
Because of this statistical problem, we cannot determine
whether interstate banking had a significant impact on bank
performance. Consequently, we focus on branching
deregulation in the remainder of the article. 
ROBUSTNESS OF THE PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS 
A possible explanation for the observed reduction in
loan losses and loan rates is that banks made fewer risky
loans following branching deregulation. If the output
mix of banks changed from riskier to safer loans follow-
ing deregulation, then we might expect to observe
declines in both loan losses and loan rates. Changes in
banks’ output could also explain declines in noninterest
expenses if, for instance, banks provided fewer checking
accounts (which are relatively costly for banks to main-
tain) following deregulation. To investigate this possi-
bility, we estimate the effects of deregulation on
noninterest expenses, loan losses, and loan prices while
controlling for banks’ output mix. In each case, we find
that the improvements in costs and the reductions in
loan losses and loan prices after branching deregulation
remain statistically significant even after controlling for
the output mix. We also find no decrease in two risky
loan categories—credit cards and commercial loans—
following branch deregulation, suggesting that banks
did not shift to safer loans after deregulation.14
It is possible, however, that within each loan cate-
gory banks are making safer loans after deregulation than
they did before. So, even though the volume of credit card
loans and commercial loans has remained fairly constant,
after deregulation the loans themselves may be less risky.
This is unlikely for two reasons. First, evidence suggests
that, if anything, banks increased their risk taking after geo-
graphic deregulation because eliminating entry barriers
reduced banks’ franchise value (Keeley 1990). Second, as
we indicate below, banks with higher profits and fewer loan
losses grew faster than banks with lower profits and more
loan losses once branching was permitted. Declines in loan
losses seem to reflect not a change in the inherent riskiness of
the pool of borrowers but better screening and monitoring
of borrowers by the banking system.
We have established that bank performance in the
average state improved following statewide branching. But
did banks in only a few states experience improvements, or
was the phenomenon widespread? To answer this question, we
look at the changes in bank cost efficiency in individual
states (Chart 2). Specifically, we plot the change in banks’
ratio of charge-offs to total loans before and after dereg-
ulation relative to the corresponding change for the group
of states that did not deregulate their branching laws during
the period. This “control group” of states is used to remove the20 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / DECEMBER 1997
effects of nationwide shocks to bank performance. The control
group consists of the eleven states that are identified in Table 1
as having deregulated in or before 1970 and the three that are
identified as not having deregulated as of 1992.15
The change in loan charge-offs for each of the thirty-
three deregulating states appears as a single point plotted
above the year of deregulation for that state; multiple points
appear above a year when more than one state deregulated in
that year. Consider the example of Pennsylvania, represented
by the single point plotted in 1982. This state’s mean charge-
off ratio rose by about 0.3 percentage point after deregulation
in 1982, while all states that did not change policy in 1982
experienced a 0.7 percentage point increase in charge-offs after
1982. We therefore report a relative decline in charge-offs of
0.4 percentage point for Pennsylvania.
As the chart shows, reductions in loan losses fol-
lowing branching deregulation are widespread; in all
states but New Hampshire and Utah, charge-offs
decline after deregulation relative to the change in
charge-offs experienced by states that did not deregulate
branching during the period. Similar pictures emerge
for both loan prices and noninterest expenses. For loan
prices, we find declines following branching deregula-
tion in twenty-five cases out of thirty-three. Again,
New Hampshire is a significant outlier.16 We find that
noninterest expenses fall in nineteen out of the twenty-
four deregulating states available for this analysis, again
relative to the control group of states.
WHY DEREGULATION IMPROVES BANK EFFICIENCY
Limits on bank expansion could have had adverse effects
on efficiency in banking for at least three reasons. First,
prohibitions on branching and interstate banking may
have limited the opportunity for the best run banks to
grow. In unregulated markets, more efficient firms have a
natural tendency to gain market share over their less pro-
ductive competitors, an outcome that will increase aver-
age efficiency as the industry evolves over time. By
preventing better run banks from establishing branches,
and by preventing BHCs from expanding across state
lines, these regulations may have retarded this natural
evolution. After the geographical constraints were lifted,
the more efficient banks may have expanded, thereby
improving the performance of the average banking asset.
We call this the selection hypothesis. 
Second, limited restrictions on geographic expansion
may have weakened the discipline that markets usually place
on managers of corporations. When interstate banking is pro-
hibited, managers worry less about takeovers. Because their
jobs are more secure, they may also be less motivated to
increase shareholder value, maximize efficiency, and minimize
costs. According to this disciplining hypothesis, efficiency in
banking improves after deregulation because managers are
forced to increase shareholder value in order to preserve their
jobs. Note that the disciplining hypothesis predicts that all
banks will improve their performance following deregulation,
since managers at all banks will come under greater pressure.
By contrast, the selection hypothesis predicts that the more
efficient banks will gain market share, not that the efficiency
of all individual banks will improve.
A third possible reason why efficiency might
improve following deregulation is that barriers to geo-
graphic expansion prevent banks from operating at the
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most efficient size. There is some evidence, for instance,
that small banks can reduce average costs by expanding up
to about $500 million in total assets (Berger, Hunter, and
Timme 1993). According to the economies of scale hypothesis,
the efficiency of the banking system will improve after
deregulation as small banks grow and reduce costs. Of course,
according to this view, all of the benefits come from changes
occurring at the lower end of the bank size distribution. Since
small banks hold a relatively small share of total banking
assets, these benefits would likely be small.
Which of these three explanations best accounts for
the efficiency gains observed following deregulation? We can
rule out the economies of scale explanation on two grounds.
First, there is scant evidence of scale economies in banking
beyond about $500 million in total assets (Berger, Hunter,
and Timme 1993). The large improvements that we have
found in the state-level aggregates cannot plausibly be attrib-
uted to the fact that small banks are moving closer to
the optimal scale. In 1980, for instance, banks with under
$500 million in assets (in 1994 dollars) held less than
30 percent of total assets in the banking system. Second, we
have estimated the change in our performance measures
following branching deregulation for small banks (those
with assets under $100 million) and large banks sepa-
rately. We find that the improvements are greater for
large banks than for small, a finding inconsistent with
the economies of scale explanation.17
More difficult to evaluate is the hypothesis that man-
agement discipline accounts for the beneficial effects of
branching deregulation. Because we lack good measures of the
degree of managerial effort at banks, we cannot test this
hypothesis directly. Nevertheless, we cannot reject the possibil-
ity that disciplining played some role in the improved effi-
ciency of banks. Hubbard and Palia (1995) find evidence of
greater managerial discipline following interstate banking:
the turnover rate for banks’ chief executive officers rises and
the pay-performance relation tightens once states allow inter-
state banking. Hubbard and Palia contend that these changes
result from a more active market for corporate control after
deregulation. Such changes may well have disciplined man-
agement to improve bank performance, although neither this
article nor the Hubbard and Palia study establishes this point. 
The remaining explanation for bank efficiency
gains, the selection hypothesis, can readily be tested. To do
so, we examine whether better run banking companies
grow faster than their less efficient rivals following branch-
ing deregulation. First, we classify banks on the basis of
their profitability just before deregulation. We then
observe the change in the market share after deregulation
for the high-profit banking companies. If the selection
hypothesis is correct, we should find that profitable banks
increase their market share at the expense of unprofitable
banks following deregulation.
Specifically, for each state, we first rank banking
companies from highest to lowest according to their return
on equity at the end of the year prior to the year of deregula-
tion. Next, we go down that ranking until we reach a bank
that, together with all previous banks, accounts for 50 per-
cent of the state’s bank assets. The banking companies in this
group constitute our high-profit firms.18 We then calculate
the group’s share of state bank assets five years after
branching deregulation.19 As implied by the selection
hypothesis, we find that the high-profit banking companies
grow faster after branching deregulation (Table 2, row 1);
their share of banking assets increases, on average, by
8.5 percentage points (from 51.3 percent to 59.8 percent)—a
statistically significant increase.20
Table 2
















Post-deregulation  period 51.3  59.8  8.5
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council, Reports of Condition and Income.
Notes:  The table reports the change in the share of total bank assets held by that 
half of the banking companies with the highest return on equity at the beginning 
of the specified six-year period. The post-deregulation period begins the year 
before the year of deregulation; the pre-deregulation period begins seven years 
before the year of deregulation. The t-statistic reported below the market share 
change for each period tests the hypothesis that the change equals zero.
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
(3.91)**
Pre-deregulation  period 49.9  51.7  1.8
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Of course, we would expect banks enjoying
high profits and good loan portfolios to grow relatively
faster at all times, even when branching restrictions are
in place. In other words, the fact that banks with good
balance sheets grow faster than less profitable banks
need not indicate that deregulation caused the weaker
banks to lose ground. To isolate the effects of deregula-
tion on selection, we compare the differential growth
rates of high- and low-profit banks in a deregulated
environment with the same differential growth rates in
a regulated environment.21
 A striking contrast is evident in the growth rates
achieved in regulated and deregulated environments (Table 2).
High-profit banks increase their market share by only
1.8 percentage points (from 49.9 to 51.7 percent) in the
average state over the pre-deregulation period (Table 2, row 2).
This change is so small that we cannot reject the possibility
that high-profit banks do not increase their market share at all
over the six-year period before deregulation (that is, 1.8 percent
is not a statistically significant change). In the post-
deregulation period, by contrast, the market share of the
high-profit banks rises sharply. In sum, the evidence in
Table 2 strongly supports the hypothesis that branching
deregulation forced a process of selection whereby weaker
banks lost ground to better run banks.22
DEREGULATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Thus far we have argued that relaxation of geographic
restrictions improved the performance of the banking system,
enhancing the efficiency of the average bank asset and
improving bank lending. How did these changes affect the
rest of the economy? Earlier research has shown that countries
with better developed banking systems grow faster because
savings are channeled into the highest-return investments
(King and Levine 1993). Banks can help to route savings to
the most productive uses in two ways. First, they provide
information about the profit potential of different busi-
nesses, channeling savings toward good projects and away
from bad. Second, banks monitor those firms with which
they have lending relationships to ensure that bank funds
are put to proper use (Diamond 1984).23
Branching deregulation should enhance the
ability of banks to direct savings to the best projects and
to oversee the successful execution of those projects. As
we have seen, banks function better after branching
deregulation, and their loan losses decrease sharply. The
selection hypothesis suggests that these improvements
occur because banks that are better able to screen and
monitor loans are able to expand their operations at the
expense of less effectively managed banks after deregula-
tion. As a result, the economy can grow faster because
savings flow more consistently into profitable invest-
ment opportunities.
THE EFFECT ON STATE ECONOMIES
To investigate whether state-level rates of economic growth
did in fact increase following branching deregulation,24 we
estimate the change in the average growth rate of two mea-
sures of economic activity: real per capita personal income
and real per capita gross state product.25 These two measures
differ somewhat in concept: Personal income reflects the
income of a state’s residents, providing a measure of residents’
welfare. Gross state product, by contrast, measures the total
incomes of factors of production located within the state,
allowing us to assess the economic activity that actually occurs
there.26 As in our estimates of the effects of branching deregu-
lation on bank performance, we control for both business cycle
effects and the effects of differences in the long-run growth
rate across states.27 Our tests of the effects of branching dereg-
ulation on the state economies show a significant acceleration
in growth: annual personal income grows about 0.51 percent-
High-profit banking companies grow faster 
after branching deregulation; their share of 
banking assets increases, on average, by
8.5 percentage points—a statistically
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age point faster after branching deregulation, and gross state
product, about 0.69 percentage point faster (Table 3, row 1).
This acceleration is not only statistically significant at the
5 percent level but is also economically “large” relative to the
1.6 percent annual average growth rate of real per capita per-
sonal income over the sample period. 
Of course, there is uncertainty associated with this
estimate—with a 5 percent probability of error, we can
only be confident that personal income growth increased
somewhere between 0.06 and 0.97 percentage point. More-
over, these figures are estimated under the assumption that
the growth pickup persists indefinitely. One possibility is
that the economy benefits for a few years as the banking
system becomes more efficient, then growth returns to the
level that prevailed before the policy change.
We disentangle the short- and long-run effects
of deregulation on growth by assessing the average
growth rate following deregulation during three dis-
tinct time periods (Table 3, rows 2-4). We measure the
change in the growth rate during the first five years
after branching deregulation, the change in growth rela-
tive to the years before deregulation during years five to
ten, and the change from years eleven and beyond. We
find that the beneficial effects of the policy change are
greatest during the first ten years. Personal income
growth accelerates by 0.35 percentage point in the first
five years and by 0.37 percentage point in the next five
years. But after ten years, our estimate of the growth
effect falls to 0.17 percentage point and is no longer sta-
tistically significant. In the gross state product series,
however, the increases in growth appear to last beyond
ten years. (See Box 2 for a detailed discussion of  the
growth regressions used to generate these results.)
Overall, we lack conclusive evidence on whether the
growth effects persist beyond ten years. This limitation is not
surprising, however, since we observe only about ten years of
growth experience after deregulation for most states. Never-
theless, even if the observed increases in growth do not con-
tinue indefinitely, the short-run effects appear to be large.28
ROBUSTNESS OF THE GROWTH ACCELERATION
Did many states experience a growth pickup in the wake of
branching deregulation or was the change concentrated
among a few? To evaluate whether the effects were wide-
spread, we offer a state-by-state assessment of the growth
in personal income. Chart 3 plots the average change in
growth for each of the thirty-five states that deregulated
their branching restrictions relative to the average change
in growth for the nonderegulating states. (The latter group
of states, as in Chart 2, is used to control for nationwide
changes in growth.) Like Chart 2, Chart 3 plots these
growth changes by the year of deregulation.
The growth acceleration following deregulation is
clearly a general phenomenon. Twenty-nine of the thirty-
five states that deregulated performed better than the non-
deregulators. (The exceptions are New Hampshire, Florida,
Michigan, Kansas, Colorado, and New Mexico.) Even when
the deregulating states experienced growth declines following
Table 3
STATES’ ECONOMIC GROWTH ACCELERATES
AFTER BRANCHING DEREGULATION 
Change in Personal 
Income Growth
(Percentage Point)
Change in Gross State 
Product Growth
(Percentage Point)
(1) Overall increase in growth 0.51 0.69
(2.22)** (2.09)**
(2) Increase in growth, years 1-5 0.35 0.60
(1.75)* (2.07)**
(3) Increase in growth, years 5-10 0.37 0.65
(1.85)* (2.41)**
(4) Increase in growth, years 10+ 0.17 0.67
Source: Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Tables 2 and 5, rows 3 and 7.
Note: The t-statistics are given in parentheses.
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
(0.89) (2.48)**
Annual personal income grows about
0.51 percentage point faster after branching 
deregulation, and gross state product, about 
0.69 percentage point faster.24 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / DECEMBER 1997
Personal Income Growth Rates Accelerate
after Branching Deregulation in All but Six States
Chart 3
Change in growth rates













































branching, the nonderegulators generally fared even worse.
This pattern suggests that when a downturn was occur-
ring in the national business cycle at the time of branch-
ing deregulation, the downturn was at least partly offset
by the positive effects of statewide branching.
We have shown that rates of economic growth
increased following branching deregulation. The increase is
both statistically large, which suggests that we can be con-
fident that it is not the result of chance, and economically
large, which suggests that over time economic welfare
would be raised dramatically as a consequence of the
accelerated growth. The growth acceleration is also wide-
spread, benefiting twenty-nine of the thirty-five deregulating
states. The remaining question, however, is whether
deregulation actually caused the growth pickup. Estab-
lishing causal relationships is always difficult in empirical
economics because researchers cannot run controlled
To estimate the effects of branching deregulation on growth,
we use the following model:
where Yt,i is a measure of real per capita income (output),
 is a branching indicator equal to 1 for states that allowed
statewide branching at most five years ago,   is a branch-
ing indicator equal to 1 for states that allowed statewide
branching six to ten years ago, and   is a branching indicator
equal to 1 for states that allowed statewide branching more
than ten years ago. 
In this specification, the g coefficients measure the
increase in per capita economic growth stemming from
branching deregulation at different time periods. The at
terms measure the common, economy-wide shocks to growth
such as the national business cycle. The m terms capture the
effects of the state-specific business cycle, and d reflects the
extent to which poorer states grow faster (the “convergence
effect” observed in Barro and Sala-I-Martin [1992]).
Yti , Yt 1 i , – ¤ at g5Dti ,
5 g10Dti ,
10 g10Dti ,
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BOX 2:  AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF GROWTH
We estimate the model with a variety of different
specifications. The simplest uses ordinary least squares
(OLS). The model is also estimated by weighted least squares
(WLS), with weights proportional to the size of the state
economy at the beginning of the period. We use WLS because
measurement error in state economic data—particularly in
data relating to interstate commerce—is likely to be greater
for smaller states. Smaller states are also more likely to depend
on a limited number of industries, leading to greater sus-
ceptibility to industry-specific shocks. In all cases we
report heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980).
While there is no a priori reason to suspect that
regional business cycles will introduce a bias, we also present
estimates from an augmented version of the above model
allowing the time effects (that is, the business cycle effects)
to vary across four broad regions of the United States. This
specification is included mainly as a robustness check. Table 1 in
the text shows that many states in the South and Midwest
deregulated around the same time, leading to the possibility
that regional business cycle effects drive the estimate of the
growth effect coefficients. To control for the regional business
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experiments. Nevertheless, we must consider other fac-
tors that could explain our finding. One possibility is that
state governments instituted a variety of new policies at
the same time that they deregulated their banking sys-
tems. If so, these policy changes could be responsible for
the improved growth performance.
We find no evidence of such coincident policy
changes. The political control of state governments did not
change significantly around the time of branching deregu-
lation. In only two cases out of thirty-five did control of
both houses of the state legislature and the governorship
pass from one political party to the other during the four-
year election cycle leading up to branching deregulation.
The political affiliation of both houses of the state legislature
changed only six times out of thirty-five during the four-
year window before branching deregulation.
BOX 2:  AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF GROWTH (Continued)
cycle, we modified the above model slightly by interacting
the year-fixed effect with four regional indicator variables (for
the Northeast, South, West, and Midwest).
The table below presents the results of estimating
these models. Almost all specifications show that the increase in
growth after branching deregulation lasts up to ten years, but
only half the models show a growth increase beyond ten years.






















GROWTH BASED ON PERSONAL INCOME
  Basic model, OLS 0.59** 0.86** 0.34 0.14* -0.03 -0.04 -0.38** 0.52%
 (0.23) (0.23)  (0.22) (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.13) (1,015)
  Basic model, WLS 0.61** 0.86** 0.34** 0.20** 0.06 0.04 -0.29** 0.73%
 (0.21) (0.22)  (0.16)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.08) (1,015)
  Regional effects, OLS 0.35 0.37* 0.17 0.08 -0.03 0.02 -0.29** 0.64%
 (0.20) (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.11) (974)
  Regional effects,WLS 0.31** 0.38** 0.21 0.16** 0.04 0.07 -0.28** 0.79%
 (0.16)  (0.19)  (0.13)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.09) (974)
GROWTH BASED ON GROSS STATE PRODUCT
  Basic model, OLS 0.77** 0.94** 0.63** 0.21** 0.09* 0.03 -0.07** 0.41%
(0.30) (0.30) (0.27) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (521)
  Basic model, WLS 0.64** 0.83** 0.48* 0.21** 0.13** 0.06 -0.09** 0.62%
(0.26) (0.33) (0.26) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (521)
  Regional effects, OLS 0.60** 0.65** 0.67** 0.15** 0.06 0.07 -0.04* 0.50%
(0.29) (0.27) (0.27) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (500)
  Regional effects, WLS 0.43** 0.57** 0.59** 0.23** 0.11** 0.08 -0.08** 0.69%
(0.21) (0.24) (0.24) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (500)
Source: Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Table 5.
Notes: The table presents estimates of the increase in state economic growth following relaxation of intrastate branching restrictions. Delaware is dropped from all 
regressions used to produce these estimates while Alaska and Hawaii are dropped from the regressions with regional effects. In addition, the year in which each state 
deregulated was dropped. Growth data for personal income are from 1972-92 and for state product from 1981-91 (three years are lost with the addition of the 
lagged dependent variables).  In column 8, the number of observations appears in parentheses below the R2. In columns 1-7, standard errors appear in parentheses 
below the coefficients. Reported standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent (White 1980).  The coefficients on the branching indicators and the lag of income 
are multiplied by 100.
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.26 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / DECEMBER 1997
Moreover, even after controlling for two measures of
state fiscal policy—the ratio of public investment by the state
government to total income and the ratio of tax receipts by the
state government to total income—we continue to find a sig-
nificant growth acceleration after branching deregulation. Our
tests suggest that there were no changes in states’ tax and
other fiscal policies that coincided with branching deregula-
tion and that could explain the observed increase in state eco-
nomic growth following statewide branching. 
Another possible explanation for our finding is
that state legislatures relaxed branching restrictions in
anticipation of faster growth and the need to finance attractive
projects. Why might this be the case? Perhaps when a state
has strong growth prospects, potential bank borrowers pressure
state governments to deregulate their banking systems. But if
states deregulated branching rules because they anticipated
the need to finance a future economic boom, then we should
see a sharp rise in bank lending following deregulation.
Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) demonstrate, however, that
no increase in lending occurred. Moreover, the growth
effects of branching deregulation remain largely
unchanged even after we control for loan growth.
Finally, we consider the possibility that some
unobserved set of technological changes led to branching
deregulation, improved bank performance, and increased
economic growth. For example, increased competition
from nonbank financial institutions clearly helped to spur
the removal of barriers to branching. Perhaps such financial
innovations also forced banks to improve their performance
and boosted states’ economic growth. Two considerations,
however, lead us to discount this possibility. First, if this
explanation were true, we would see an improvement in
bank performance and increased economic growth
immediately before, as well as after, deregulation. Our
data show no such pattern.29 Second, any technological
changes that occurred around the time of deregulation
should have affected all states. In that case, we should
not see any improvement in bank performance nor any
increase in economic growth in deregulating states relative
to nonderegulating states. Our data, of course, provided clear
evidence of such differences in the experiences of the states. 
To summarize, the large increase in bank loan
quality in conjunction with little or no change in loan
growth suggests that the increase in states’ economic
growth was at least partly due to statewide branching. The
improvements in banking stemming from selection (and
possibly disciplining) appear to have had important
beneficial effects on the economy. 
CONCLUSION
Restrictions on bank branching have proved to be very
costly. By preventing the more efficient banks from
expanding at the expense of their less efficient rivals, these
restrictions retarded the “natural” evolution of the industry.
As our analysis has shown, once state branching restrictions
were lifted, the efficiency of the banking system improved
as the better banks expanded into new markets. Bank
borrowers benefited from lower loan rates, while the over-
all economy grew faster as banks did a better job separating
the good projects from the bad and monitoring firms after
lending relationships had been established. State restrictions
on interstate banking may have created similar constraints,
although our statistical procedure has a harder time
identifying such effects.
The Riegle-Neal Act removes the remaining geo-
graphic barriers to bank expansion and permits the creation
of multistate banking franchises. This federal legislation
may produce benefits similar to those achieved through
state deregulation—reduced bank costs, lower loan rates,
and accelerated economic growth. Nevertheless, it is possible
that the latitude given banks to create branches and buy
out-of-state banks over the last two decades may have
already weeded out weaker institutions and exhausted the
benefits of geographic deregulation. Whether there is
additional room for improved efficiency through the
process of selection remains to be seen.ENDNOTES
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1. Although the act gives each state the right to prevent out-of-state banks
from owning branches there, only Texas and Montana have chosen to do so.
2. Several types of geographic restrictions have been imposed over the
years on banks, but this article focuses on limits on banks’ ability to
establish branches within their home states and on limits on BHCs’
ability to acquire banks outside their home states. We do not consider
other restrictions, such as those prohibiting the formation of multibank
BHCs, primarily because we lack the necessary data.
3. Although some states removed barriers to branching before 1978 (see
Table l), most of the state deregulatory activity was concentrated in the
1978-92 period. The focus on this period also enables us to take
advantage of the greater availability of bank data after 1978.
4. We include Delaware and South Dakota in Table 1, but we exclude
them from our analysis (see Box 1).
5. Many states also permitted de novo branching after permitting banks
to branch through mergers and acquisitions. We do not emphasize de novo
branching powers because bank expansion into new markets generally
occurs through the purchase of whole banks or branches of banks located
in those new markets, not through the opening of new branches.
6. Information on the timing of states’ deregulatory initiatives is taken
from Amel (1993).
7. For instance, in 1982 Pennsylvania passed a law permitting banks to
branch in the home office county, in a contiguous county, in a
bicontiguous county, or in the counties of Allegheny, Delaware,
Montgomery, and Philadelphia. In 1990, Pennsylvania permitted
unrestricted branching statewide. In the results presented below, we
assume that by 1982 Pennsylvania permitted intrastate branching
(despite the fact that the process was not finished until eight years later)
because the effect of the 1982 law brought Pennsylvania so close to
complete intrastate branch freedom. We follow a similar practice for
Ohio, Virginia, and Washington. Our results are not sensitive to the
alternative dating of deregulation in these four states.
8. The noninterest expense variable equals total noninterest expenses
incurred by all banks in a state divided by total banking assets held by
banks in that state. The loan price variable equals interest earned on all
loans and leases in a state divided by total loans plus leases held on bank
balance sheets in that state.
9. When we control for the state business cycle, the estimated effects of
statewide branching decrease but are still both statistically significant
and economically important.
10. The long-run average level of bank loan losses may differ across states
because banks operating in states dominated by particularly high-risk
industries will exhibit higher loan losses. Oil states such as Texas, Alaska, and
Louisiana, for instance, exhibited loan losses that exceeded the national
average during our sample period. Improvements in loan quality after
deregulation could therefore reflect a tendency for states dominated by high-
risk industries to deregulate their branching and interstate banking
restrictions later than the typical state. We accounted for this possibility by
controlling for persistent cross-state differences in bank performance.
11. We find declines in loan loss provisions and nonperforming loans of
similar magnitude following branching deregulation. See Jayaratne and
Strahan (forthcoming).
12. We find no change in deposit interest rates following deregulation,
however. All of the cost declines seem to be passed along to bank
borrowers rather than depositors.
13. The estimates of the effects of deregulation on our performance
measures are based on a regression model that assumes that the changes
occur immediately following deregulation and are permanent. Because
we have only five to ten years of experience after deregulation for most
states, we cannot be sure that these effects will continue indefinitely.
Nevertheless, we find that the observed improvements in bank
performance persist more than five years after branching deregulation.
14. These results are reported in Jayaratne and Strahan (forthcoming).
15. New York and Maine are dropped from this analysis because they
deregulated before loan charge-off data became available. As noted
earlier, Delaware and South Dakota are dropped throughout the analysis.
16. New Hampshire eliminated its branching restrictions in 1987, just
before the beginning of the New England banking crisis. This sequence of
events might explain why bank performance is observed to deteriorate after
deregulation.
17. These results are available on request.
18. When we substitute loan charge-offs for return on equity as a measure of
bank quality, we obtain similar results. To conserve space, however, we do
not include these results in this article. In addition, we do not include
noninterest expenses in this analysis, because the data are available beginning
only in 1984. The lack of earlier data means that we can conduct the exercise
in Table 2 for only three deregulating states using noninterest expense data.
19. We chose this window length because most of the observed changes
in bank structure occurred within five years after branching deregulation.28 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / DECEMBER 1997 NOTES
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Note 19 continued
For example, nearly two-thirds of the 30 percent increase in the state-
level bank asset concentration occurred within five years after branching
deregulation. Similar results are reported in Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise
(1995), who find that most changes to bank structure occur within five
years after geographic deregulation. (Some states entered interstate
banking agreements during the five-year window. For these states, we
use the year just prior to the year in which the state entered the interstate
banking agreement as the end of the window. We dropped four states—
West Virginia, Tennessee, Oregon, and New Hampshire—that entered
interstate banking agreements in the same year or one year after
branching was deregulated.)
20. Although high-profit banks are defined to have 50 percent of a
state’s bank assets at the beginning of the deregulation period, we can
only approximate this target because no group of banks in a state will
contain exactly one half of that state’s total bank assets. Thus, in Table 2,
high-profit banks are shown to have 51.3 percent of the average state’s
bank assets, not 50 percent.
21. We define high-profit banking companies before deregulation in
much the same way we defined high-profit banking companies after
deregulation. Banking companies are identified as high-profit on the
basis of their return on equity at the end of the year seven years before the
year of deregulation. We then measure their change in market share over
the next six years.
22. Recall that we found only weak evidence that overall bank profits
increased after branching deregulation. This earlier finding does not
conflict with the fact that high-profit banks grew faster than low-profit
banks. Two forces are operating. Because the high-profit banks tend to
grow at the expense of their less efficient competitors after deregulation,
aggregate profits should increase, all else being equal. At the same time,
however, because the high-profit banks are likely to have achieved their
superior growth rates in part by charging customers less, aggregate
profits should drop. These two forces are approximately offsetting: thus,
overall profits changed little following deregulation.
23. For instance, banks write loan covenants that restrict firms’ ability
to engage in certain activities during periods of financial distress. The
writing and exercising of such covenants allow banks to monitor their
borrowers effectively (Morgan 1995).
24. We focus here on branching deregulation, rather than interstate
banking, because once we controlled for the business cycle, we found
sharp improvements in bank performance associated with statewide
branching but not with interstate banking. Although we looked for
evidence of changes in economic growth associated with interstate
banking, we found none.
25. Statistics on personal income and gross state product are published
annually by the U.S. Department of Commerce. Annual state population
figures are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census. We convert nominal
personal income to constant dollars using a national price deflator, the
consumer price index.
26. The difference between personal income and gross state product is
apparent in how the two measures treat capital income. Capital income
is allocated to personal income according to the state of residence of the
owner of capital, while for gross state product, capital income is allocated
according to the physical location of the capital itself. Real per capita
personal income grew 1.6 percent per year during our analysis period
(1972-92), while gross state product grew 1.4 percent per year between
1978 and 1992. (Because the Commerce Department changed the base
year for the industry price deflators in 1977, we could not construct a
consistent growth series prior to 1978 using gross state product.)
27. To control for regional business cycle effects, we include a set of time
dummy variables that vary across four broad regions. For details, see
Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Table 2.
28. Note that there are theoretical reasons to believe that reductions in
financial market frictions can increase the steady-state growth rate of the
economy. For a survey of the relevant models, see Galetovic (1994) and
Pagano (1993).
29. These results are available from the authors upon request.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York provides no warranty, express or
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